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These are appeals filed under the formal procedure pursuant 
to G.L. c. 58A, § 7 and G.L. c. 62C, § 39(c) from the refusal of 
the Commissioner of Revenue (“Commissioner” or “appellee”) to 
grant an abatement of corporate excise assessed to Deckers 
Outdoor Corporation (“Deckers” or “appellant”) under G.L c. 63, 
§ 38 for the tax years ended December 31, 2007, December 31, 
2008, December 31, 2009, and December 31, 2010 (collectively, 
the “tax years at issue”).   
Commissioner Good heard these appeals and was joined in the 
decisions for the appellant, in part, and for the appellee, in 
part, by Chairman Hammond and Commissioners Scharaffa, Rose, and 
Chmielinski.  
These findings of fact and report are made at the requests 
of the appellant and the appellee pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 13 
and 831 CMR 1.32. 
 
John S. Brown, Esq., George P. Mair, Esq., Donald-Bruce 
Abrams, Esq., and Darcy A. Ryding, Esq. for the appellant. 
 
 Celine E. de la Foscade-Condon, Esq., and Brett M. 
Goldberg, Esq., for the appellee.   
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT 
I. Introduction and Jurisdiction 
At all times relevant to these appeals, the appellant was a 
Delaware corporation whose principal place of business was in 
Goleta, California. The primary issue in these appeals was 
whether the appellant was a “manufacturing corporation” within 
the meaning of G.L. c. 63, § 38(l)(1) (“§ 38”) during the tax 
years at issue, such that it was required to apportion its net 
income using a single-factor apportionment formula, based on 
sales.  A secondary issue was whether the Commissioner properly 
assessed to the appellant penalties under G.L. c. 62C, § 35A (“§ 
35A”) for substantial underpayment of taxes.   
For tax years 2007 and 2008, the appellant filed 
Massachusetts corporate excise returns on Form 355. On April 3, 
2009, the appellant filed an amended return for tax year 2007. 
On October 28, 2011, following an audit, the Commissioner issued 
to the appellant a Notice of Intent to Assess additional taxes 
for the tax years 2007 and 2008.  On December 1, 2012, the 
Commissioner assessed additional taxes in the amount of $29,693 
for tax year 2007 and $86,368 for tax year 2008, and informed 
the appellant of those assessments by Notice of Assessment dated 
December 4, 2012.   
On December 20, 2012, the appellant filed an Application 
for Abatement on Form CA-6 for tax years 2007 and 2008 with the 
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Commissioner, which the Commissioner denied by Notice of 
Abatement Determination dated April 24, 2013.  On June 14, 2013, 
the appellant timely filed its petition with the Appellate Tax 
Board (“Board”) for tax years 2007 and 2008, which was given 
Docket No. C320020. Based on the foregoing facts, the Board 
found and ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear and decide the 
appeal. 
For tax year 2009, the appellant filed a Massachusetts 
corporate excise return on Form 355, which it later amended, and 
for tax year 2010 it filed corporate excise returns on both 
Forms 355 and 355U.  Following an audit, the Commissioner issued 
to the appellant Notices of Intent to Assess additional taxes 
for tax years 2009 and 2010, dated July 12, 2013 and July 15, 
2013, respectively.  By Notices of Assessment dated August 20, 
2013 and August 21, 2013, the Commissioner notified the 
appellant that he had assessed additional taxes in the amount of 
$144,382 for tax year 2009 and $104,139 for tax year 2010.   
On September 13, 2013, the appellant filed Applications for 
Abatement on Form CA-6 for tax years 2009 and 2010 with the 
Commissioner, which were denied by Notice of Abatement 
Determination dated September 27, 2013.  The appellant filed its 
petition for tax years 2009 and 2010 with the Board on November 
12, 2013, which was given Docket No. C321955.  Based on the 
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foregoing facts, the Board found and ruled that it had 
jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeal.   
The evidence in these appeals consisted almost entirely of 
the Statement of Agreed Facts and stipulated exhibits offered by 
the parties, along with the testimony of a single witness, 
Mr. David Lafitte.  At the time of the hearing of these appeals, 
Mr. Lafitte was the Chief Operating Officer of Deckers.  Before 
assuming that position, Mr. Lafitte served as in-house counsel 
to Deckers, and before that, including during the tax years at 
issue, he served as outside counsel to Deckers.  Based on the 
evidence entered into the record, including Mr. Lafitte’s 
testimony, the Board made the following findings of fact.  
II. The Appellant’s Business Operations 
A.  United States Operations 
Deckers was founded as a footwear company in 1973.  At that 
time, its principal product was a flip-flop sandal, which, by 
the tax years at issue, it no longer sold.  During the 1990s, 
Deckers acquired the UGG footwear brand, which is best known for 
its line of sheepskin boots.  Its other major brand was Teva, 
which is best known for its outdoor-lifestyle sandals.  Deckers 
also owned a few lesser-known footwear brands, and a very minor 
portion of its business involved the sale of accessories other 
than footwear.   
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During the tax years at issue, Deckers had between 350 and 
900 employees in the United States (“U.S.”).  Deckers was the 
principal reporting corporation for a large corporate group 
which included several subsidiaries that were disregarded 
entities for tax purposes.   
Deckers headquarters was located in Goleta, California. The 
headquarters facilities consisted of two buildings which 
contained primarily office and administrative space, in addition 
to a materials library.  The materials library was essentially a 
showroom containing numerous swatches of textiles, leathers, and 
other materials that may become part of a footwear product.  
Deckers designers used the materials library to review and 
select components of potential new footwear products.  The 
materials library also contained packaging material samples. The 
Goleta facility did not have a manufacturing floor, nor did any 
facility owned by Deckers. Instead, as will be discussed further 
below, Deckers engaged third-party factories to produce its 
footwear products.   
 Deckers also operated two distribution centers, both 
located in California. In addition, Deckers operated several UGG 
brand retail stores during the tax years at issue, including in 





B. International Operations 
 While Deckers itself did not own facilities or have 
employees outside of the U.S., it was the parent corporation for 
a group of international subsidiaries.  Most relevant for 
purposes of these appeals were Deckers Macau Ltd. (“Macau”) and 
Deckers Outdoor (Guangzhou) Consulting Co., Ltd. (“Guangzhou”).     
 The Guangzhou office is located in Pan Yu City, Guangzhou, 
China.  During the tax years at issue, it employed from 40 to 70 
people. Guangzhou had its own local management team, but that 
team ultimately reported to senior management at Deckers.   
 The function of Guangzhou within the Deckers organization 
was to act as a liaison between the U.S.-based design team and 
the third-party factories that produced the footwear products. 
Because ensuring the completion and delivery of a product line 
in time for the appropriate season was of the essence, one of 
the functions performed by Guangzhou was ensuring that a factory 
had adequate capacity to deliver the products on time.  
Guangzhou employees were also involved with compliance and 
quality control at the factories.  
 Macau had five to seven employees during the tax years at 
issue. Like Guangzhou, it had its own local management team, but 
that team reported most directly to Guangzhou and, ultimately, 
to senior management at Deckers. The function of Macau within 
the Deckers organization was to place purchase orders with 
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factories and to act as a liaison with the factories.  Macau was 
also involved in managing the shipping of finished products.   
III. The Creation of Deckers’ Products: “The Critical Path” 
Mr. Lafitte described the way that Deckers footwear 
products come into being.  The process, referred to as “the 
critical path,” takes approximately 18 months.  It begins at 
Deckers with the creation of a product brief.  A product line 
manager for a particular brand creates a product brief for a 
proposed shoe, and this brief contains information such as the 
nature of the shoe, its target customers and price point, and 
information regarding its market competitors.  A product brief 
might also include photographs of similar products and more 
detailed marketing information. 
The next step in the process is the design drawings, done 
by a Deckers product designer.  Initial sketches of a product 
might be done manually or with graphics software.  These initial 
drawings are two dimensional, and might include information 
about the leather or materials to be used in the product. These 
drawings are always done for sample sizes, which are men’s size 
nine and women’s size seven. 
Following this step, and with more input from a Deckers 
product line manager and product developer, the designer will 
create more detailed drawings, typically using software.  At 
this point, color schemes for the products are selected, a 
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process which Deckers calls “colorways.”  Similarly, materials 
for each portion of the potential products are specified, a 
process which Deckers calls “materials mapping.”  Drawings at 
this stage are still two dimensional, but contain much more 
information, often stating measurements down to the millimeter. 
The detailed drawings present both lateral and medial views of 
the shoe, and contain specifications as to the type of stitching 
for each component, placement of the logo, and the color scheme 
and materials to be used. All of the foregoing steps are 
performed by Deckers employees.   
These more detailed, two-dimensional drawings are then sent 
to Guangzhou, which will work with local factories to create an 
actual shoe from them. The resulting three-dimensional sample 
products, always in men’s size nine and women’s size seven, are 
sent back to Deckers for the next step in the process, the 
initial line review. 
The initial line review takes place in California and 
typically involves a large team of Deckers employees, from the 
product line manager to the designer to members of the sales and 
marketing departments. They review every aspect of the sample, 
from its look and feel to its functionality. The design and 
selected materials, which in turn influence price point, are 
also discussed in the context of the shoe’s viability as a 
market product. At this point, Deckers could drop a proposed 
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shoe from a line altogether, or make significant changes to the 
proposed design elements. 
The changes desired by Deckers following the initial line 
review are communicated back to Guangzhou, and in turn, the 
factories, which produce a second set of samples incorporating 
those changes. A final line review of the footwear samples is 
then conducted.  Fit testing is part of both the initial and 
final line review. Personnel in Guangzhou as well as Deckers 
employees in California with the correct shoe size – men’s size 
nine and women’s size seven – try on the sample shoes and give 
feedback on their fit. The feedback is documented in a report 
called “Fit Sample Results,” and Deckers may make changes to a 
product based on that feedback.  For example, following the fit 
testing for a Teva Tamur shoe, Deckers instructions based on the 
tester’s comment that the U-throat area was tight were: “Please 
cut off the supertuff 6600 at the bottom of the eyestay. It’s 
making the U-throat area too stiff.”  For a Teva Sunkosi shoe, 
following a tester’s comment that “the binding stitches are 
rough and can be felt,” the instructions were: “the joint of the 
binding at the back center needs to be moved to the medial 
side,” and those instructions were accompanied by a photograph 
pointing to the problem area.   
Following the final line review, a sales meeting is held in 
California to forecast the demand for the product. A new set of 
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samples, which incorporates any changes made as a result of the 
final line review, will be produced for this meeting.   
During the preceding steps, Deckers creates a spec sheet 
for the proposed shoe. The spec sheets include: drawings of the 
product, the materials to be used for each component of the 
proposed shoe, the color scheme, the intended season for the 
product (spring/summer or fall/winter), and the product design 
team members involved.  Spec sheets will specify information 
such as the type of material to be used for stitching, along 
with the number of stitches per inch. Precise information as to 
each component of the shoe is imperative so that an accurate 
cost breakdown of the shoe can be computed. The spec sheets also 
typically state the vendor from whom the materials are to be 
acquired.   
All of these steps culminate in the creation of a tech 
pack.  A tech pack is a multi-page document created by Deckers 
containing detailed information about the footwear item to which 
it relates, including drawings, materials, precise measurements 
of the features, and colors.  A sample tech pack entered into 
the record as Exhibit 52 shows that the front page of a tech 
pack consists of a “designer check list,” and the items on that 
list that must be completed are: line art of the individual shoe 
(left lateral view); line art of all relevant different views; 
technical line art of hardware/software molded components, to 
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scale with cross-sections and measurements; dimensions for all 
logos and straps; material and texture preferences, including 
material name, code, supplier, and reference swatch; information 
for hardware/molded components; and lastly, colorway and 
material mapping information. The tech packs also include 
information about the molds, tooling, and lasts
1
 to be used for 
the creation of the product.   
The tech pack is usually e-mailed by Deckers to the 
factories.  The factories will use the tech pack to create 
three-dimensional renderings of the shoe.  The factories then 
engage a mold-maker to create the molds and other items 
necessary for mass production of the shoe. Because the molds 
contain valuable Deckers trademarks, title to them does not pass 
to third-party factories, only possession.   
Once a final sample has been approved, usually by both 
Guangzhou and Deckers personnel, the mass production of the shoe 
begins.  Because all iterations of the product to this point, 
both two and three dimensional, have been limited to a men’s 
size nine and women’s size seven, the factories will use 
computer-assisted technology to scale the designs for other 
sizes.   
                                                 
1
 A last is a type of foot model, or dummy foot, used in manufacturing 
footwear.   
ATB 2018-238 
 
Quality control is conducted throughout the production 
process.  This includes inspection of the raw materials as well 
as checks such as stress and pull tests on random samples coming 
off of a production line. Factories have their own quality 
control teams, but Guangzhou personnel are also present in the 
factories to facilitate quality control.  A final quality 
control inspection takes place at Deckers distribution centers 
in California following shipment from the factories. This 
inspection is conducted by Deckers employees.   
IV. Deckers was “Engaged in Manufacturing.”  
On the basis of the record in its totality, the Board 
concluded that Deckers was “engaged in manufacturing” for 
purposes of § 38.  The Board found that Deckers’ activities 
throughout the entirety of the critical path amounted to the 
transformation of “raw or finished physical materials by hand or 
machinery, and through human skill and knowledge, into a new 
product possessing a new name, nature, and adapted to a new 
use.” G.L. c. 63, § 38(l)(1).  In reaching this conclusion, the 
Board found that the materials created by Deckers, including the 
tech packs, were physically useful in making the footwear 
products that it ultimately sold.  They were not valuable solely 
for their artistic or intellectual content, but for the exact 
and precise information they specified for every component of 
every shoe.  Further, the Board found that Deckers employees 
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physically interacted with the footwear products throughout the 
production process, including fit testing and final quality 
inspection, and that their feedback resulted in physical 
modifications to the products.   
In order to be considered a § 38 manufacturer, a company 
must not only “engag[e] in manufacturing,” but it must also do 
so “in substantial part.”  In its post-hearing brief, Deckers 
argued that even assuming arguendo that it “engaged in 
manufacturing” for purposes of § 38, it did not do so “in 
substantial part.”  G.L. c. 63, § 38(l)(1). The statute sets out 
methodologies for making a determination of substantiality, 
including numerical thresholds based on the taxpayer’s gross 
receipts, tangible property, and payroll, as well as by 
reference to the Commissioner’s regulations, but the appellant 
asserted that only one of those tests was relevant here – “gross 
receipts . . . derived from the sale of manufactured goods that 
it manufactures.”  G.L. c. 63, § 38 (l)(1).   
The appellant made the somewhat tautological argument that 
because Deckers does not manufacture goods at all, it does not 
derive gross receipts from the sale of goods that it 
manufactures.  This argument was negated by the Board’s findings 
that the appellant was in fact “engaged in manufacturing.”  The 
appellant offered no evidence showing that it fell short of 
numerical thresholds set forth within the statute.  As the 
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appellant had the burden of proof on this issue, the Board found 
that it did not meet its burden of demonstrating that it was not 
“engaged in manufacturing . . . in substantial part[.]”  
G.L. c. 63, § 38 (l)(1).   
V. The Assessment of § 35A Penalties  
A subsidiary issue in these appeals was whether the 
Commissioner properly assessed penalties under § 35A for the tax 
years at issue.  That section is applicable in cases where a 
portion of any underpayment is attributable to either negligence 
or disregard of the applicable legal authorities or if there is 
a substantial understatement of tax, that is, an amount that is 
the greater of 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on the 
return for the period or $1,000. However, G.L. c. 62C, § 35B 
provides that § 35A penalties shall not be assessed “with 
respect to any portion of an underpayment if it is shown that 
there was reasonable cause for such portion and that the 
taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to such portion,” with 
certain exceptions not relevant to these appeals.  G.L. c. 62C, 
§ 35B.   
Based on the evidence, and as will be discussed further in 
the Opinion below, the Board found that, although the 
appellant’s tax returns for the tax years at issue each had a  
substantial understatement of tax as defined by § 35A, the 
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appellant had reasonable cause and acted in good faith in 
reporting its taxes.  Among the factors considered by the Board 
in reaching this conclusion was the appellant’s retention of 
national accounting firms KPMG and Ernst & Young to assist with 
the preparation of its tax returns.  Accordingly, the Board 
found that the Commissioner’s assessment of penalties under 
§ 35A was improper, and it therefore ordered an abatement of 
those penalties.   
In conclusion, based on the record in its totality and the 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the Board found and ruled 
that Deckers was a “manufacturing corporation” for purposes of 
§ 38, and as such, it was required to use a single-factor 
apportionment formula for the tax years at issue.  It therefore 
decided that issue in favor of the Commissioner.  However, the 
Board found that the appellant demonstrated reasonable cause and 
acted in good faith in reporting the taxes due on its returns 
for each of the tax years at issue, and it therefore granted an 
abatement of the substantial understatement penalties assessed 
by the Commissioner under § 35A. 
       OPINION 
Pursuant to § 38, a “manufacturing corporation” that has 
income from business activity that is taxable both within and 
without Massachusetts is required to apportion its net income 
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using a single-factor formula, based entirely on its sales, 
rather than the three-factor formula based upon property, 
payroll, and sales factors.  The use of a single-factor formula 
based on sales for businesses with little payroll or property 
within Massachusetts tends to increase their tax liability as 
compared to the use of a three-factor formula that non-
manufacturing corporations are entitled to use. That was 
precisely the case for Deckers, and the primary issue presented 
for the Board’s consideration was whether Deckers was a 
“manufacturing corporation” for purposes of § 38.   
Section 38 defines “manufacturing corporation” as follows:  
[A] corporation that is engaged in manufacturing. In 
order to be engaged in manufacturing, the corporation 
must be engaged, in substantial part, in transforming 
raw or finished physical materials by hand or 
machinery, and through human skill and knowledge, into 
a new product possessing a new name, nature, and 
adapted to a new use.   
 
G.L. c. 63, § 38(l)(1).  The statutory definition closely 
follows the definition articulated by the Supreme Judicial Court 
decades ago in Boston & Me. R.R. v. Billerica, 262 Mass. 439, 
444-45 (1928): “[c]hange wrought through the application of 
forces directed by the human mind, which results in the 
transformation of some pre-existing substance or element into 
something different, with a new name, nature or use.”  Because 
status as a manufacturing corporation has significance for tax 
purposes beyond § 38, what activities constitute manufacturing 
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is a question that courts and this Board have long and often 
been asked to consider. See Commissioner of Revenue v. Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 423 Mass. 42, 44 (1996) (noting that this issue 
has “spawned a great body of caselaw”).   
 A focal point in these cases has been “whether the 
processes under study ‘effect[ed] the kind of change and 
caus[ed] a correlative degree of refinement to the source 
material,’ sufficient to qualify as ‘manufacturing.’”  Houghton 
Mifflin, 423 Mass. at 47 (quoting William F. Sullivan & Co. v. 
Commissioner of Revenue 413 Mass. 576, 581 (1992)).  For 
example, converting frozen steak into cooked steak and crushing 
larger stones into smaller stones was not manufacturing. 
York Steak House Sys., Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 
393 Mass. 424, 426 (1984); Tilcon-Warren Quarries, Inc. v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, 392 Mass. 670 (1984).  However, 
scouring raw waste wool into wool ready to be spun into thread 
or cloth; converting cast off pipe, appliances, automotive parts 
and other metal items into compressed and baled scrap metal; and 
converting standing timber into cut lumber all constituted 
manufacturing.  See Assessors of Boston v. Commissioner of 
Corps. & Taxation, 323 Mass. 730, 748 (1949); William F. 
Sullivan & Co., 413 Mass. at 581; Joseph T. Rossi Corp. v. State 
Tax Comm’n, 369 Mass. 178, 181-82 (1975).    
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In recent years, given the prominent role that contract 
labor now plays in modern business, there have been numerous 
opportunities to consider scenarios substantially similar to the 
present appeals, i.e., whether a company was “engaged in 
manufacturing” when it created drafts, plans, designs, or 
blueprints for products and then sent them off-site or to a third 
party for mass production. That question has consistently been 
answered in the affirmative.  See Houghton Mifflin, 423 Mass. at 
49 (holding that a book publisher that edited and compiled 
photographs, drawings, and text onto discs and sent them to a 
third-party printer for the production of books was “engaged in 
manufacturing”); The First Years, Inc. v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2007-1004, 1013 
(finding that creation of designs for child-care products, 
building of models and development of specifications for molds 
produced by third parties, returned to company for testing, and 
then sent to third-party factories for production was “engaged 
in manufacturing”); Onex Communications Corporation v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, 457 Mass. 419, 431 (2010) (holding that 
the development of computer-edited blueprints containing the 
technical specifications and detailed manufacturing instructions 
for certain components that were then sent elsewhere for final 
production constituted manufacturing); Duracell, Inc. v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 
2007-903, 918 (finding that extensive research and development 
ATB 2018-245 
 
and quality testing that was incorporated into sample batteries 
that were ultimately mass produced elsewhere constituted 
manufacturing); Random House, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 
Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2012-973, 981 (finding 
that company that edited and formatted content that was 
ultimately transmitted electronically to a third-party printer 
for production, to taxpayer’s exact specifications, was “engaged 
in manufacturing”).   
In reaching these determinations , courts have encouraged a 
broad construction of the phrase “engaged in manufacturing .” See 
Assessors of Boston, 323 Mass. at 748-49 (“The words ‘engaged in 
manufacturing’ are not to be given a narrow or restrictive 
meaning.”).  See also William F. Sullivan & Co., 413 Mass. at 
579.  To that end, processes which themselves do not yield a 
finished product have nonetheless been found to constitute 
manufacturing, so long as “‘they constitute an essential and 
integral part of a total manufacturing process.’” William F. 
Sullivan & Co., 413 Mass. at 579-80 (quoting Joseph T. Rossi 
Corp., 369 Mass. at 181-82).  See also Commissioner of Revenue v. 
Fashion Affiliates, Inc., 387 Mass. 543, 545-46 (1982) (finding 
that a computer system used to produce dress patterns on paper 
markers, which were then transferred for use onto the actual 
fabric for the mass production of dresses, provided “a fu nction 
that is an integral and necessary” step in the making of dresses 
and thus constituted manufacturing).  See also 830 CMR 
58.2.1(b)(7).    
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Courts have recognized that manufacturing involves a 
“multiplicity of processes,” William F. Sullivan & Co., 413 Mass. 
at 580, and that, in analyzing these cases, “the requisite 
inquiry should focus less on the technical means and materials 
used by [the taxpayer] and more on [the taxpayer’s] role in the 
overall production of the [products].”  Random House, Mass. ATB 
Findings of Fact and Reports at 2012-985-86. Significant to the 
Court in Houghton Mifflin, and described in some detail, was 
Houghton Mifflin’s involvement in every step of the “book-
production process,” described as follows:  
Initially, editors, ordinarily employed by [Houghton], 
engage in extensive research and development 
activities regarding a proposed book. These activities 
include researching the probable marketability and 
developing the content and format of a proposed book. 
[Houghton’s] employees then design, write, and produce 
a manuscript to serve as the content of a proposed 
book.  Various writers and editors working on 
different portions and aspects of a proposed book 
combine their work on a network.  
 
Next, [Houghton’s] employees produce and then 
circulate among the company’s marketing, production, 
and editing personnel thumbnail sketches for further 
processing and refinement.  After that step, 
electronic-production specialists transform the 
manuscript and thumbnail sketches into templates  
which are analogous to blueprints or page outlines 
without any text. [Houghton’s] art department then 
creates drawings, develops charts and graphs, and 
creates line art for inclusion in the ultimate 
product.  The art department also selects, retrieves, 
and transforms photographs for incorporation into the 
ultimate product.  
 
Following these steps, all of the aforementioned items 
are assembled into layouts. First proofs are 
subsequently produced and marked for changes and 
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corrections, resulting in the production of second 
proofs which further refine the product. The second 
proofs are then converted into color proofs.  
Throughout this process, [Houghton] uses, among other 
things, human skill and knowledge as well as various 
implements, materials, and machines or machinery such 
as computers, digital modems, printers, photocopiers, 
writing utensils, lighting machines, drawing equipment 
and materials, graphic art tools, electronic 
equipment, sophisticated software, and scanners.  
 
From the color proof stage of the process, [Houghton] 
either produces CD ROM tapes which are then sent to 
independent contractors for final packaging in compact 
discs, or it sends the proofs (usually on computer 
diskettes) to independent contractors for printing and 
binding into conventional books. 
 
Houghton Mifflin, 423 Mass. at 43-45.  Likewise, in The First 
Years, the Board noted that the taxpayer’s employees were  
integrally involved in every step of the product 
creation process, from the conception of an idea for a 
new product through the completion of the final 
product offered for sale to consumers.  [The First 
Years] employees were responsible for proposing new 
products, conducting extensive background and consumer 
research for any proposed new product, creating and/or 
overseeing the creation of intricate preliminary 
models, establishing the regimen of tests for a 
proposed new product, conducting the testing of the 
product and overseeing independent testing of the 
product, overseeing the creation of the “final model,” 
overseeing the tooling and molding process, and 
finally, auditing the final product manufacturing 
process and conducting quality assurance tests even 
during this final stage. At any point in the process 
if the product did not satisfy quality assurance tests 
conducted by or on behalf of [The First Years], [The 
First Years] re-directed the design of the product, 
from minor to significant changes.   
 
The First Years, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2007-




 As in Houghton Mifflin and The First Years, the evidence 
here demonstrated Deckers’ continuous involvement in the 
creation of its footwear products, from the conception of an 
idea for a shoe in an initial product brief to its ultimate mass 
production.  The record showed, as it did in the many 
aforementioned cases, that Deckers transformed “ideas, art, 
information, and photographs, by application of human knowledge, 
intelligence, and skill,” Houghton Mifflin, 423 Mass. at 48, 
into something new, first tech packs, and later, a completed 
shoe.  Based on these facts, the Board found that the activities 
undertaken by Deckers amounted to the transformation of “raw or 
finished physical materials by hand or machinery, and through 
human skill and knowledge, into a new product possessing a new 
name, nature, and adapted to a new use.” G.L. c. 63, § 38(l)(1).    
The appellant argued in these appeals that the 
Legislature’s 1995 amendment of § 38, which inserted the word 
“physical” before the word “materials” in the statute, signified 
the Legislature’s intent to narrow the range of activities that 
would qualify as manufacturing activities for purposes of the 
statute.  This argument ignores the fact that cases decided 
following the statutory amendment have used the same analysis to 
determine what activities constitute being “engaged in 
manufacturing” as those which preceded the statutory change.  
See Onex Communications, 457 Mass. at 431; Genentech, Inc. v. 
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Commissioner of Revenue, 476 Mass. 258 (2017); The First Years, 
Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2007-1004; Duracell, 
Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2007-918; Random 
House, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2012-981.  
Indeed, the Board noted in Random House that  
the requirement in § 38(l)(1) for the transformation 
of ‘physical materials’ does not negate the long-
standing holdings of the Court and the Board that 
manufacturing can involve the creation of electronic 
processes and products in the production process so 
long as they have a substantial and physical impact on 
the final tangible products produced.  
 
Random House, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2012-
985.   
 
The appellant attempted to distinguish Deckers’ activities 
from those of the taxpayers in these cases by asserting that 
nothing created by Deckers was either physically useful in the 
ultimate manufacture of footwear or had a tangible application 
in the manufacturing process.  Deckers’ creations, according to 
the appellant, were unlike the blueprints created in 
Onex Communications, which contained detailed manufacturing 
instructions that were physically useful in the ultimate 
creation of the end product in that case - computer chips - as 
well as the CD-ROMS and computer diskettes compiled by Houghton 
Mifflin that were ultimately sent to third-party printers for 
printing en masse.  Onex Communications, 457 Mass. at 431; 
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Houghton Mifflin, 423 Mass. at 44.   
The Board found this argument unpersuasive, as it takes too 
narrow a view of Deckers’ activities.  The record amply 
demonstrated the involvement of Deckers employees throughout the 
product creation process.  The conception of an idea for a shoe 
began at Deckers with a product developer, and through the 
various stages of the critical path that idea was developed and 
refined, with accompanying drawings, photographs, and 
information, into a more precise and technical format.  The spec 
sheets and tech packs created by Deckers contained exact 
specifications for each and every component of each shoe, down 
to the millimeter, such that an actual shoe could be created 
using them.  Thus, the Board found that the materials produced 
by Deckers throughout the critical path, including the design 
drawings, spec sheets, and tech packs, were physically useful in 
the manufacture of a completed product.   
Further, once a sample shoe was created, Deckers employees 
interacted with the shoe sample by inspecting it and engaging in 
fit testing, and their feedback was incorporated into – that is, 
had a physical impact on – subsequent renditions of that shoe, 
including its construction and design. See Duracell, Mass. ATB 
Findings of Fact and Reports at 2007-923.  Deckers’ activities 
were not merely prerequisites to the manufacturing process, as 
they occurred throughout its entirety, right down to final 
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quality inspection of the mass-produced goods.  See 830 CMR 
58.2.1(b)(5).  In sum, the Board found that Deckers’ activities 
were very much like those of the taxpayers in Houghton Mifflin, 
The First Years, Duracell, Onex Communications, and Random 
House, and it therefore found and ruled that Deckers was 
“engaged in manufacturing” for purposes of § 38.2   
  The statute imposes an additional requirement.  In order to 
be considered a manufacturing corporation for purposes of § 38, 
a corporation must be “engaged in manufacturing. . . in 
substantial part[.]” G.L. c. 63, § 38(l)(1) (emphasis added).  
The statute sets forth specific tests for determining whether a 
taxpayer’s manufacturing activities will be considered 
“substantial.”  A corporation’s manufacturing activities will be 
considered “substantial” if any one of the follow five tests is 
met:  
                                                 
2
 The appellant likened its activities to those of the hypothetical furniture 
designer discussed by the Court in Houghton Mifflin, whose creation of 
furniture designs to be used by another party to build furniture, the Court 
suggested, would not be considered manufacturing.  Houghton Mifflin, 
423 Mass. at 49. The Board did not find this analogy compelling, for several 
reasons.  First, the Court’s statements regarding the furniture designer were 
not the result of an analysis of a factual record developed during a full 
evidentiary hearing concerning the furniture designer’s activities throughout 
the entire furniture creation process. The Court referenced the furniture 
designer only to address an argument made by the Commissioner in that case, 
an argument that ultimately did not prevail.  Moreover, the Court’s 
observation regarding the furniture designer was hardly a resounding 
endorsement of the Commissioner’s argument. It consisted of the lukewarm 
acknowledgement that the Court agreed, “in principle, with [the] general 
statement” that a furniture designer would not be classified as a 
manufacturer, before concluding that there was a “reasonable basis for 
distinguishing,” the taxpayer’s activities in that case. Id. The Board found 
the appellant’s analogy to the hypothetical furniture designer to be 
unpersuasive, and it therefore rejected this argument.   
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1. twenty-five percent or more of its gross receipts 
are derived from the sale of manufactured goods that 
it manufactures;  
2. twenty-five percent or more of its payroll is paid 
to employees working in its manufacturing operations 
and fifteen percent or more of its gross receipts are 
derived from the sale of manufactured goods that it 
manufactures;  
3. twenty-five percent or more of its tangible 
property is used in its manufacturing operations and 
fifteen percent or more of its gross receipts are 
derived from the sale of manufactured goods that it 
manufactures;  
4. thirty-five percent or more of its tangible 
property is used in its manufacturing operations; or  
5. the corporation's manufacturing activities are 
deemed substantial under relevant regulations 
promulgated by the commissioner.  
G.L. c. 63, § 38(l)(1).    
The appellant claimed that only one of the factors applied 
here – gross receipts – and that it did not satisfy that test 
because, as it did not manufacture any goods, its gross receipts 
were not derived from goods that “it manufactures.”  G.L. c. 63, 
§ 38(l)(1).  This argument was undermined by the Board’s finding 
that the appellant was “engaged in manufacturing” for purposes 
of § 38.   
Further, the appellant offered no evidence showing that it 
fell short of the specific numerical thresholds set forth within 
the statute.  The only inference to be drawn from the record is 
that the appellant derived all of its gross receipts from the 
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sale of products that it manufactured.  As the appellant had the 
burden of proof on this issue, the Board found that it did not 
meet its burden of demonstrating that it was not “engaged in 
manufacturing... in substantial part[.]”  G.L. c. 63, § 38 
(l)(1).  See Staples v. Commissioner of Corp. & Tax, 305 Mass. 
20, 26 (1940)(finding that a person who claims to be aggrieved 
by the refusal of the Commissioner to abate a tax in whole or in 
part has the burden of establishing the right to an abatement). 
A subsidiary issue in these appeals was whether the 
Commissioner properly assessed penalties for substantial 
understatement of taxes against Deckers under § 35A. That 
statute is applicable in cases where, as here, the 
understatement for the period exceeds the greater of 10 per cent 
of the tax required to be shown on the return for the period or 
$1,000. G.L. c. 62C, § 35A. However, the penalty may be abated, 
in whole or in part, if the taxpayer can demonstrate that it had 
reasonable cause and acted in good faith in taking the position 
that it did. G.L. c. 62C, § 35B.
3
  
Reasonable cause and good faith are determined on a “case-
by-case basis, taking into account all pertinent facts and 
                                                 
3
 The penalty may also be abated if the taxpayer can show that “substantial 
authority” existed for the tax treatment of the item at issue.  G.L. c. 62C, 
§ 35A.  Because the Board concluded that the appellant demonstrated that it 
acted in good faith and had reasonable cause for filing as a non-
manufacturing corporation, it did not reach the issue of whether substantial 
authority existed for the appellant’s position.   
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circumstances.”  See DOR Directive 12-7.  Among the factors to 
be considered in making a determination of reasonable cause is 
whether the taxpayer placed reasonable reliance on professional 
tax advice. Id.  The record in the present appeals showed that 
the appellant engaged national accounting firms KPMG and Ernst & 
Young to assist in the preparation and filing of its tax return, 
thus this factor must be weighed in the appellant’s favor.     
Moreover, as discussed above, the determination of whether 
a particular company is “engaged in manufacturing” is a fact-
based inquiry. See William F. Sullivan & Co., 413 Mass. at 581 
(“[T]he undefinable nature of the operative terms in these . . . 
cases necessitates case-by-case, analogical development of their 
meaning."). The long history of cases, cited above, shows that 
this determination often hinges on subtle factual distinctions.
 4
   
Deckers considered itself to be a designer and seller of 
footwear products whose activities did not fall within the scope 
of § 38. While the Board disagreed, the appellant certainly did 
not flout a bright-line rule. Based on the evidence in its 
totality, and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the Board 
found and ruled that the appellant acted with reasonable cause 
                                                 
4
 It is worth mentioning that in many of the above-referenced cases, the 
Commissioner was the party arguing that the activities at issue did not 
constitute manufacturing.  See Houghton Mifflin, 423 Mass. at 44; The First 
Years, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2007-1004; Onex 
Communications, 457 Mass. at 431; Duracell, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and 
Reports at 2007-918.   
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and in good faith in filing its tax returns for the tax years at 
issue.  Accordingly, the Board found and ruled that the 
appellee’s assessment of penalties under § 35A was improper, and 
it issued an abatement of those penalties, along with associated 




In conclusion, on the basis of all of the evidence, the 
Board found and ruled that the appellant was “engaged in 
manufacturing . . . in substantial part,” for purposes of § 38 
during the tax years at issue, such that it was required to use 
a single-factor apportionment formula.  Accordingly, the Board 
decided that issue in favor of the appellee.  However, the Board 
found and ruled that the appellant had reasonable cause and 
acted in good faith in filing its tax returns as a non-
manufacturing corporation for the tax years at issue, and the 
appellee’s assessment of penalties under § 35A was improper.  
The Board therefore decided that issue in favor of the 
appellant, and granted an abatement of those penalties, along 
with associated interest.   




                      By: ___________________________________ 
                          Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., Chairman 
 
 
A true copy, 
 
Attest: ____________________________ 
           Clerk of the Board 
 
